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Dralla: Private Police

WHO'S WATCHING THE WATCHMAN?
THE REGULATION, OR NON-REGULATION, OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTION,
THE PRIVATE POLICE*
Gloria G. Oralia
Deborah B. Honig
Deborah Penny Port
Shaunee H. Power
Sara Ann Simmons

Police have always been the object of an ambivalent public attitude. From the founding of the first public police force in 1829 police
have been regarded by some segments of society as an institution essential for the preservation of public order and the protection of persons and property. However, the development of police forces has
been paralleled by consistent concern that the power they exercise
infringes on the freedom of individuals. The resolution of these conflicting views of the police has never be adequately examined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the police have survived and grown as an institution in Anglo-American society, despite such conflicting views, in
part because of the evolution of various mechanisms intended to limit,
control and regulate the exercise of police power. 1 The acceptance of
the police institution has been paralleled by the development of departmental discipline, legal controls, review boards and personnel
incentives.

In the past several decades private police have appeared on the
law enforcement scene in unprecedented numbers. Although private

* The authors wish to thank Professor Bernard L. Segal for his patience. encouragement and assistance, all of which were invaluable.
1. Many police control mechanisms have been the subject of detailed criticism,
and the effectiveness of such mechanisms has been strongly challenged. But, ·the fact
that society has felt impelled to establish such a system supports the conclusion that
police cannot be permitted to exist in a democratic society without a system of restrictions.
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police have long existed and, in fact, antedate public police forces,
only recently has the private police industry in the United States
rivaled the public police in size and scope. If present trends continue there may be twice as many private as public police within a
decade. 2
The private police phenomenon is more than just a matter of the
industry's growth. Of at least equal importance is the extent of these
services and their consumers. Among the most recent and important
consumers of private police services have been governmental agencies. For example, private police supply the greater portion of antihijacking security services at publicly-owned and operated airports.
They are also used extensively to protect property and control crowds
in government facilities.
The powers of public and private police are not identical, but
for many purposes the differences are not as important as might initially be thought. There are at least two reasons for this. First, a substantial number of private police exercise the same powers as public police, except that the geographical area within which these
powers may be exercised is limited for private police. 3 Second, socalled "security guards" comprise a large segment of the private police
industry. Such guards, generally, utilize many of the same indicia of
power that public police use, including uniforms, badges, and other
insignia. Many carry weapons including guns, batons and chemical
sprays, as well as handcuffs. The limits on the scope of their power to
arrest and detain suspects is often murky. This is a result of the absence of legislation on the subject and because arrests by private police have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny to the same extent as
have arrests by public police.
Consequently, persons who have contact with private police are
often faced by persons whose appearance, equipment and actions are
virtually indistinguishable from those of public police. It is unlikely
that either a citizen or private policeman can make a fair and frank
evaluation of the limits of the private police officer's powers during
such a confrontation. And, the courts have seldom dealt with these
issues after-the-fact.
2. J. KUKALlK & S. WILDHORN, PRIvATE POLlCE IN TIm UNITED STATES, 5 vols.
(1972) (prepared by the Rand Corp. for the U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter
cited as RAND]. For a critical examination of the Rand Study see M. LIPSON, ON
GUARD: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE SECURITY (1975).
3. Industrial police (e.g., iron and steel, railroad guards) and natural resources
police (e.g., lumber, fish, animal protection guards) are among the clearest examples
of private police whose powers often appear identical to those of public police.
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Two basic questions arise from the existence of private police
with their present authority:
First, if the institution of a public police
force is tolerated because the power it wields is
circumscribed by the system of controls imposed, what controls should society impose upon
private police?
Second, would not consistent public policy
require that police power in private hands, however limited, be subject to greater control and
regulation than such power in the hands of public agencies?
Questions about the current state of private police regulation
readily follow: Is there meaningful regulation of the private police
industry? How effective is supervision where it exists? How much regulation should there be? It is the object of this study to provide some
answers to these questions.
Private police in the United States had not been subjected to systematic analysis prior to 1970. In that year, the Rand Corporation
began a study of the private police industry for the U.S. Department
of Justice, the results of which were published in 1972.4 The
Rand study assembled data on the regulation of the private
police by state and local governments. In addition, it made recommendations relevant to future governmental policy in regulating private police. But, it did not propose standards by which the adequacy
of the regulation and control of the private police industry was to be
measured. Because the functions of private police parallel those of
their public counterparts, the nature of controls over public police
must provide the "yardstick" by which the control and regulation of
private police should be measured.
The first two sections of this article deal with the historical development of controls over public police in England and the United
States. It is the thesis of the first section that a centralized police system
was adopted in England with considerable reluctance, despite an obvious need for the replacement of the existing methods for dealing
with crime and disorder. This reluctance was overcome only by an
agreement to impose strict controls and limitations on police power.
Our discussion of public police in the United States concludes that
4. RAND. supra note 2.
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Americans, who were perhaps even more hostile than the English to
the establishment of police forces, also turned to police when traditional institutions proved inadequate to deal with urban unrest in the
mid-nineteenth century. Unlike the centralized English police forces,
American police forces were kept under local jurisdiction. A consequence of such fragmentation has been the institution of a wide variety
of controls which have been tried sporadically in the United States
during the past hundred years. However, the recognition of the need
for and the imposition of controls has paralleled the growth in the
size and importance of public police forces in the United States.
The last sections of this article examine the controls private police in the United States are subjected to, and show that there has
been, in fact, very little control exercised. The few controls that have
been imposed have seldom dealt with the significant issues. They have
not reflected the same areas of concern that have been aroused over
the public police. This disparity reflects attitudes that may have once
been appropriate when the numbers and scope of employment of
private police were limited but such conditions no longer prevail.
These last sections also show that the controls which currently exist
vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. On the whole, they are
inadequate to provide the public with protection against abuses of
power by private police.
The most universal device adopted by states in dealing with private police has been the imposition of requirements for bonding. A
special survey was conducted of state agencies responsible for the
handling of these bonds. The results showed that in many instances
these agencies had no information as to how often aggrieved members
of the public resorted to suits on these bonds. And, where information
was available, it indicated that such suits, or even complaints, were
rarely brought.
Another survey was made of the attorneys general of all states.
Their views were sought as the principal state government official
concerned with all aspects of law enforcement. The bulk of them candidly admitted that present regulation of private police was unsatisfac!ory. They also concluded that significant improvement in the pattern of regulation was not an immediate prospect. The results of
the bonding survey and the survey of state attorneys general present
empirical data to support the validity of the conclusion of the Rand
study, and of this study, that more comprehensive and meaningful
controls over private police are desirable and necessary in light of
their importance in contemporary society.
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I. CREATION OF THE FIRST MODERN POLICE FOROE IN
ENGLAND
During the period from the death of Elizabeth I in 1603 to the
establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, England
was transformed from a rural nation into a modern industrial one.
Although comprehensive statistics on crime were not compiled until
after 1800, there are many indications that a growth in crimes against
property paralleled the industrialization and urbanization of England. 1I
Even before 1800, the demonstrable inadequacy of England's
crime prevention institutions had received attention. In 1785 the government attempted to create a police organization independent of the
magistry. The London and Westminster Police Bill, introduced in
Parliament in that year, disregarded the traditional rights and privileges of the chartered City of London by treating it and the Metropolis
as a single unit for police purposes. 6 In addition, the proposed legislation expanded the powers of the constables in the areas of search and
seizure and arrest of suspected criminals. 7 The constables were to be
subordinate to three commissioners appointed by the Crown and given justice of the peace status. The commissioner-justice positions
were to be stipendiary, the salaries paid by the government. 8
So strong was the opposition to the creation of a centralized police independent of the magistry that the bill was withdrawn without a
vote being taken. 9 Part of the opposition to the bill came from individuals and groups on whose power the police would have encroached.
The inclusion of the City of London -threatened the zealously guarded
powers of the City's mayor and alderman, whose resistance remained
so strong that the City was not included under the 1829 police bill. 10
Most important, the bill's sweeping grant of power in the administration of justice to an independant magistry and constabulary
which derived its power from the national government rather than
local governmental units alienated large segments of population.
Many feared that a centralized police force would subject Englishmen
to a system of police surveillance like that of France, and that English
5. 1 L. RADZINOWIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH CluMINAL LAw AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 143 (1948) [hereinafter cited as RADZINOWICZ]; J. TOBIAS,
NINETEENTH CENTURY CRIME IN ENGLAND 81-82 (1972).
6. 3 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 110.

7. ld. at 114-15.
8. Id. at 111-12.
9. ld. at 121.
10. 4 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 171.
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liberties would be endangered thereby.u In 1829, although crime
was widespread, the likelihood that a police force would be created in
London or anywhere else in England appeared remote. Yet in that
year Parliament adopted Robert Peel's plan to establish a police force
for the Metropolis of London. The question that immediately arises is,
why did Peel's bill succeed?
Undoubtedly Peel's political astuteness played a significant part
in the bill's passage. For example, he purposely limited the scope of
his bill to the Metropolis of London, so that it did not face the formidable opposition of the City's officials. But the answer to this question
also lies in the changes that had taken place in England by 1829,
for England had experienced widespread economic and social unrest,
largely the result of industrialization. When domestic uprisings, occurred, the threat to national security served as a justification for
using the army against the rebels. 12 The army was the government's
primary means of dealing with the sporadic riots of hosiery knitters,
weavers and other workers in the cloth industry which began in
1811-1813 and continued unti11818Y
After Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the government found it more
difficult to use the military to quell civil disturbances. Popular fear
and dislike of the army was reflected in opposition to billeting in
private lodgings and later in barracks throughout the country.14
Consequently, other means of maintaining public order were sought.
The civil institutions traditionally charged with keeping the peace
fared badly when used in civil disorders. By 1800, local militia,
paid out of land taxes, were composed of members of the lower ranks
of society. OCyasionally they sided with the rioters, but even when
they did not, discipline was so poor that they were considered undependable protectors of property and keepers of the peace. 15
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, attempts
were made to revive the posse comitatus, which was changed from its
onginal form of a group of citizens assembled at a moment's notice
11. For an example of the popular resistance to a centralized police force on the
French model see 1 E. HALBVY, A HISTORY OF TIlE ENGLISH PEOPLE 39 (1924),
citing Letters to Ivy, December 27, 1811, where one Englishman wrote:
They have an admirable police at Paris but they pay dear enough.
I had rather half-a-dozen people's throats should be cut in Ratcliff
Highway every three or four years than be subject to domiciliary
visits, spies, and all the rest of Fouche's contrivances.
12. C. RErrn, BRITISH POLICE AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 27 (1943).
13. 4 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 5, at 122-23.
14. E. HALEVY, supra note 11, at 63 fI.
15. 4 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 110.
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to pursue felons into a group of men instructed in the use of weapons
and military techniques to be used when summoned by a magistrate
to control an uprising. HI In the final analysis, however, only the army
was considered trustworthy and effective in the event of rebellion.
Beginning with the Luddite riots in 1811 the army was employed
regularly as the "police force of industrial England."17
Opposition to the use of the army in civil disturbances was not
confined to a single class. The size of the army, its unsettled relation to
civil authority, the danger of mutiny, and the threat to liberty posed by
maintaining a large standing army in peacetime and quartering
troops in the countryside were issues in Parliament in the late 1820s. 18
Even the conservative Duke of Wellington, while reiterating his faith
in the loyalty and effectiveness of the army, wrote in 1823 that an
alternative had to be found. 19
The prospect of social upheaval and the failure of traditional
means of keeping the peace brought home to British leaders what
even the most alarming criminal statistics had apparently failed to
demonstrate-that a police force was necessary. But they saw its
function not so much as fighting crime as in filling the void in the
preservation of public order created by the failure of the militia and
yeomanry and general dissatisfaction with the army as a means of
achieving this end. As a result, the primary purpose of police work in
the nineteenth century was the maintenance of order; the prevention
and detection of crime remained secondary until much later. 20
Robert Peel, the Prime Minister credited with the founding of
the Metropolitan Police of London, regarded it as an experiment
which, if successful, would be the model for a national police system.2~
But it was by no means certain that the police would be allowed to
continue even long enough to demonstrate that they merited imitation. Peel's Tory government fell late in 1830, and successive Whig
governments, though unwilling to abolish the police outright, adopted various tactics designed to curb their effectiveness. The effect of
public hostility toward and distrust of the police acted as a rigorous
control on the exercise of police authority. Moreover, controls were
built into the very structure of the police force. Although intended to
16. ld. at 107-10.
17. ld. at 123.
18. ld. at 153-55.
19. ld. at 157.
20. J. MARTIN & G. WILSON, THE POLICE: A STUDY IN MANPOWER 7 (1969).
21.

!f. RADZINOWlcz, supra note 5, at 159-60.
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be non-military in organization, composition and appearance,22 they
turned to military organization as a means of maintaining internal
discipline in the force. A chain of command was established, running
from the commissioners through superintendents, inspectors and sergeants, to the constables who walked the beat in the seventeen police
districts into which the Metropolis was divided. 23 The activities of
every member of the force were supervised. Superint~ndents, who
were responsible for all activities of the men in their divisions, submitted detailed reports to the commissioners, especially when police conduct was called into question. These reports were subject to scrutiny
by the commissioners and served as the basis of their reports to the
Home Office. 24
Another control was -the imposition of high standards of personal behavior on constables, with dismissal for failure to maintain these
standards. The commissioners established stringent, objective criteria for judging recruits and refused to allow police positions to be filled
through the patronage system, by then a national scandal. Prospective
constables had to supply character references as well as meet physical
and mental requirements, among them literacy: 25 Although there were
more applications than positions available, dismissals and resignations
produced a high turnover of police personnel in the early 1830s.
Drunkenness led to a significantly large number of dismissals. 26
Dismissal from the force could also result from an investigation
of individual police conduct on the basis of a complaint from a private
citizen. In the early years of the Metropolitan Police, its commissioners required that every citizen's complaint be investigated internally
and established procedures for investigation. 27 Constables were also
subject to trial in the magistrates' courts for excesses committed in the
line of duty. Since these courts were generally hostile to the police,
and since individual constables had to pay the costs of legal defense,
civil liability operated as a rigorous and sometimes patently unjust
form of control. 28
Conscious of the public fear of and hostility toward the military,
London took the final step in "civilianizing" the Metropolitan Police:
constables, even those who patrolled outlying districts, were not to
C. RElTII, supra note 12, at 35.
ld. at 36-37.
ld. at 92-94. Reith quotes several examples of these reports.
T. CruTCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 52 (1967).
26. 4 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 5, at 1<i6.
27. C. RElTII, supra note 12,.at 63.
28. 4 RADzrNOWIcz, supra note 5, at 63; C. REITH, supra note 22, at 47.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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carry firearms. 29 The only visible symbol of the constable's authority
was a wooden baton or truncheon, and directives issued by the commissioners warned that even this was to be used with restraint. .
The General InstructionsS° distributed to every man on the force
inculcated the constables with a sense of the precariousness of their
position and the necessity of taking no action that could be interpreted
as overstepping their authority. The object of the police, the instructions began, was to prevent crime. The commissioners would base
their judgment of the effectiveness of the police not on the number of
criminals apprehended, but on the absence of crime in the area under
their controJ.31 But restraint was of primary importance in achieving
this highly desirable goal. "In the novelty of the present establishment," the Commissioners of Police warned, "particular care is to be
taken that the constables . . . do not form false notions of their
duties and powers." The General Instructions elaborated on the constable's duty to be "civil and obliging to all people of every rank and
class" and admonished him to "remember that there is no qualification so indispensable to a police-officer as a perfect command of his
temper, never suffering himself to be moved. . . by any language or
threats that may be used. . . ."32 Metropolitan Police were used to
restore order when civil disturbances occurred in and around London.
In May, 1833, they were ordered to disperse a meeting of workers at
Cold Bath Fields, near London. Although there are conflicting reports as to the amount of force used by both sides, it is certain that
one constable was fatally wounded during the disturbance. 33 After
receiving reports on the incident, the commissioners prepared a
memorandum for distribution among the constables. In it they
warned that if subsequent investigation revealed the constables had
exceeded their duty or "committed themselves by a wanton or violent
exercise of their power," they would be punished severely by the commissioners, in addition to suffering "the penal consequences to which
they are liable by law." The commissioners concluded by taking
the .opportunity of impressing strongly on the
mind of every individual that his first duty as a
constable is to learn self command, that he must
not allow himself to be provoked by offensive or
29. 4 RADzlNOWIcz, supra note 5, at 163. With permission, constables carried
sabers on dangerous missions. Inspectors carried pocket pistols.
30. C. REITII, supra note 12, at 47, quoting GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (1829).
31. Id.
,32. Id.
33. Id.
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insulting language. 34
The commissioners' memorandum reflects the pressures of the
British attitude toward the police. From the outset the Metropolitan
police were forced to perform the function of maintaining public order in addition to their crime prevention and detection functions. As a
result, they were in the public eye at a time when Englishmen of all
classes distrusted public authority. The controls imposed on the police were the logical consequence of their ambivalent position in British society. If societal attitudes toward police have mellowed over
time, constables have nevertheless continued to be saddled with the
limitations imposed when they were still an experiment.

ill.

POLICE IN AMERICA

It is not surprising that early American police systems resembled
their English counterparts-the sheriff, constable and watch. 35 Generally, the sheriff served in unincorporated areas, the constable in
towns and villages. The constable's position was difficult to fill. The
office had been appointive in England, but became elective in the
United States until the early part of the nineteenth century.36 A man
elected constable could usually escape serving by paying a fine, and
many did SO.37 The constable's duties were many and varied, the pay
was poor, the hours long and the prestige associated with the office
low. 38 However, the constable was an essential office of local government since, in addition to his peacekeeping duties, he also served administrative functions for the courts. 39 Constables wore neither uniforms nor identifying badges. 40 Unlike a private citizen, a constable
could arrest without a warrant, and he alone could execute a warrant
issued by a magistrate. So long as he acted reasonably, he was immune from liability for false arrest.41 Supervision was exercised by
the town authorities or the magistrates. 42 With the beginning of the
annual appointments of constables and the abolition of the elective
office, the constables became professional law enforcement officers
34. C. RErnI, supra note 12, at 150, quoting Police Order, May 27, 1833.
35. B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SySTEMS 58 (1969).
36. B. SMrnI, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 71 (1960).

37. For a description of the fee system in use in Boston in the mid-nineteenth
century for payment of constables see R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 18221885, at 9 (1971).
38. J. RiCHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE 7 (1970).
39. S. BACON, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AMElUCAN MUNICIPAL POLICE 7
(1939) (unpublished thesis in Yale University Library).
40. J. RiCHARDSON, supra note 38, at 19.
41. [d. at 17-18.
42. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 9.
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during the 1800S.43
The first night watch was formed in Boston in 1634.44 Thereafter,
every major city established its own night watch. Serving as a
watchman, like serving as a constable, was an obligation owed by
every male citizen over the age of eighteen unless he fell into an exempt category or paid a substitute. 45 Attracting men of high caliber to
serve on the watch was difficult. Since any citizen with enough money
to do so hired a substitute, the positions were filled by people willing
to take the low pay. Most watchmen assumed the position in addition
to their regular occupations by day.46 Consequently, the history of the
watch is punctuated by complaints that they slept while on duty. In
1757 the New York City Gazette described the watch as a
parcel of idle, drinking, vigilant Snorers, who
never quell'd any nocturnal Tumult in their
Lives; (nor as we can learn, were ever the discoverers of a Fire breaking out,) but would, perhaps, be as ready to join in a Burglary as any
Thief in Christendom. A happy Set indeed, to
defend the right and populous City against the
Terrors of the night.47
Watchmen were also objects of ridicule by the citizenry. They were
called "Leatherheads," a derisive term which referred to the leather
helmets worn by some. 48
The powers of the night watch were more limited than those of
the constables. They did not have police powers and could arrest only
if a crime was committed in their presence, or if they were acting under the direction of a police officer. 49 They had authority to question
any person suspected of a wrongdoing and to arrest and take him
before a justice of the peace. 50
As the urban population grew, the night watch became inade-

quate to deal with the problems of the cities. Civil authorities tried
increasing the numbers of watchmen, and when, that failed, they cre43. ld.
44. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 9.
45. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 10.
46. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 115.
47. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 10, quoting New York City Gazette, Feb.
21,1757.
48. B. FOSDICK, -supra note 35, at 61.
49. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 11l.
50. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 10.
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ated a day force separate from the night watch. Boston adopted the
plan in 1838, New York in 1844. 51 The two forces, however, proved
no more effective than the single. one.
From the beginning there were many weaknesses in the constable and watch system. The watch, whether composed of ordinary citizens or appointees, operated with a high degree of inefficiency. The
constables, and sometimes watchmen, were also hampered by the fact
that they were compensated by fees rather than a salary. 52· In fact,
the fee system led to serious problems throughout the system. Cooperation among officers was infrequent since it might result in their
having to split a fee. They pursued those duties which would allow
them to reap the greatest benefits. They searched for individuals
for money even if there were no warrants out for them. When stolen
property was involved, officers were less concerned with the offenders
than with recovering the propertY-a more lucrative employment of
their time. In some cases officer and thief cooperated to stage a
crime and then split the reward money. 53
Other internal problems arose from the very nature of the watch
system. Since the personnel operated on a rotation basis, officers
could learn little about the people or areas they watched. 54 They received no training in handling emergencies and gained little experience on the job. Because watchmen received their jobs from politicians, "they made no attempt to interfere with the saloonkeepers and
gangs of 'shoulder hitters' who provided the bulk of the politicians'
support."55 Since the appointments were controlled by the town authorities, the watchman might find himself out of a job after a change
of parties. All these conditions produced low morale and lack of unity
among the watch.
Constables fared little better than the watchmen because' they
were usually appointed on an annual basis and also had to spend a
great deal of time seeking reappointment by currying favor with their
sponsors. 56 Even when constables began to be treated as professionals, their ranks were peopled with many incompetent and inefficient
individuals.
The basic deficiencies of the watch and constable systems ren51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 62.
S. BACON, supra note 39, at 1.
J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 30-31.
S. BACON, supra note 39, at 426.
,
J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 36.
[d.
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dered them ill-prepared to deal with the unrest that occurred in many
. American cities during the first half of the nineteenth century. Numerous factors contributed to urban unrest. Among them were the
continuous influx of immigrants into American cities and the tensions
which arose between them and the native-born. In addition, riots occurred over labor and wage conditions, rivalry among fire companies,
and abolitionist activities. 57 In most cases, city governments had to
call for the aid of the state militia to quell the riots. 58
The riots of the 1840s provided an impetus for finding a more
effective means of dealing with urban unrest. As a result, the first day
and night police force in the United States was established in New
York City in 1845. Other major cities soon followed suit. The establishment of the police force was not without opposition from many
quarters, however.
The Search for Effective Controls

Like the English, Americans were faced with a conflict between
the need for effective law enforcement and the fear of a standing
army. They too sought to resolve this conflict by developing controls
on the police. In England, the Metropolitan Police were directly
under the jurisdiction of Parliament. In the United States, however,
local involvement in and control of the police was maintained.59 As
a result, American police forces developed close ties to local political
processes. In the first decades following the organization of the new
forces, administrative controls were lodged in the hands of the mayor
and city council. 60 This method of selection heavily favored political
appointments. The positions were used to satisfy patronage demands
and tenure was short. 61 Generally, the chief of police was a figurehead. The real control was exercised by each ward captain. Discipline among the wards varied "according to the attention or skill and
tact" shown by the captain. 62
Political involvement in partisan politics and a lack of internal
discipline were not the only problems. From the outset, tenure was
limited both to avoid the possible establishment of a standing army
57. ld. at 474, 538; R. LANE, supra note 37, at 22; J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38,
at 28.
58. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 28.
59. G. CARTE, AUGUST VOLLNER AND THE ORIGINS OF POLlCE PROFESSIONALISM
28 (1972) (unpublished thesis in University of California at Berkeley Library).
60. B. SMITH, supra note 36, at 184.
61. B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 68.
62. ld.
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and to control the police officers more effectively. Eventually the inappropriateness of short tenure became apparent and in 1853 the
New York legislature approved tenure for good behavior. 63 Residency requirements were also used to control the new forces. To ensure a
feeling of responsibility to the community, policemen had to be residents of the city as well as the ward in which they were appointed and
in which they served. 64 This requirement also encouraged a greater
involvement in local politics.
In the first years, the police were undisciplined and unregulated
because of their high degree of involvement in local politics, their
short term of office and the lack of internal administration. One of the
best illustrations of this undisciplined attitude was in the conflict over
the issue of uniforms. Uniformed police were first urged to make the
police more visible to citizens seeking help. It was also thought that
uniforms would improve internal administration by making policemen more visible to their superiors. Members of the forces bitterly
opposed the move because it "conflicted with their notions of independence and self-respect." In New York policemen dismissed for
their refusal to wear a uniform even tpok their case to the courts,
which ruled in favor of the commissioners.65 Boston police were finally outfitted by 1859, New York police by 1860. 66

Each year the involvement in partisan politics increased, bringing new changes in personnel and policies. 61 Moreover, conditions in
the cities -and country as a whole were growing progressively worse in
the years preceding the Civil War. The police, ill-disciplined and
usually disorganized, found it difficult to deal with these conditions.
Therefore, control of the forces was gradually taken over by independent administrative boards, beginning in the middle decades of
the nineteenth century. The first board was created in Philadelphia in
1850. 68 The boards consisted of judges, mayors, city councilmen and
private citizens. Most had only minimal experience with police forces;
frequently their efforts to deal with the police were inexpert and meddlesome. 69 Police management continued to be uncertain and ineffective in the face of political involvement. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, control of local police forces was passed to the
63.
64.
6S.
66.
67.
68.
69.

J. RICHA'RDSON, supra note 38.
ld. at 49.
ld. at 6S.
R. LANE, supra note 37, at lOS.
B. SMTIH, supra note 36, at 184.
B. FOSDICK, supra note 3S, at 77.
B. SMITIl, supra note 36, at 185.
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state legislatures. 7o
The scheme was doomed from the beginning. The laws sought
to be enforced were state laws, for it was believed that control by the
state would assure equal enforcement. However, laws were not applied uniformly because the legislatures were controlled by the rural
areas at the expense of larger cities. Also, political involvement remained at the heart of all problems. In 1857, a New York newspaper
raged:
We all know that . . . the police seem powerless for good; that bold and dangerous criminals
were never so bold and dangerous, that life and
property were never so insecure; that gambling
and prostitution and illegal trade were never so
open and shameless; that the public sentiment
of danger from violence was never so acute, nor
with so much reason. And why is it? Because
the policemen are politicians, getting the places
as the reward of political service; because they
dare not or will not offend the fellows who have
fought shoulder to shoulder with them at the
polls. 71
Gradually, most cities realized the shortcomings of the plan and
abandoned it. They looked for better ways to control the police forces
in order to ensure a more organized, responsive system.
The desire for local control provided the impetus for another
solution. In the first decade of the twentieth century commission government charters were adopted by many cities. The system combined
executive and legislative powers in a commission elected by popular
vote. The various departments of city government were then distributed among the members of the commission. Because supervision of
department activities was combined with other city services, control
was rendered fragmentary and weak. Thus, the concerted attention
critical to a well organized and efficient policy system was absent.
Most cities have abandoned the system, and its readoption does not
appear likely.72 Police administrators are now appointed by most city
governments, rather than being elected. 73 Some of the political problems are thereby avoided, but police supervision still remains an issue.
70. ld. at 186.

71. B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 81, quoting New York Tribune, Feb. 5, 1857.
72. ld. at 187.
73. ld. at 188.
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A number of other controls were not developed until later in the
twentieth century. The majority were attempts to improve the quality
of the personnel selected for police work, through education, training
and inducements to be a "good" police officer, such as compensation
and promotions. External controls-police review boards, judicial
processes and ombudsmen-have also been developed to regulate the
behavior of police. Currently, the public is still attempting to develop
effective controls that will limit the powers they have given the police.
There are several types of internal controls that regulate police.
One of the first to appear in the twentieth century was formal training. 74 Police training schools remained rare and negligible in effect,
however, until well into the 1920s. 75 The greatest spur to the development of an effective police selection process was the publication of the
Wickersham Commission report in 1931. In that study, it was reported that: "1) police corruption was widespread and training was
almost non-existent; 2) inefficiency was the rule rather than the
exception; 3) communication systems were ineffective; 4) political
interference in police operations hampered honest enforcement efforts; and 5) police executives were often ill-suited to handle their
jobs."76 Police departments moved to correct some of these problems
by improving working conditions with the establishment of a merit
promotion system and with attempts to lessen the effects of external
politics. Police training and education as methods of professionalizing
the forces also gained wide acceptance at this time.
Other methods of improving the personnel have included the
development of background checks, medical examinations, tests of
physical agility and prowess, oral examinations and written civil service tests. In the past twenty years, the use of psychiatric screening and
psychological testing has become an important factor in screening out
undesirable individuals. 77
Employee participation, job mobility (vertical and horizontal)
and standarization of positions have improved the quality of personnel and made the position of police officer a more desirable one. 78
Inducements to stay a "good" policeman have also increased since the
beginning of the century. A rise in status, compensation (salaries
A

74. The first training schools were opened in the 1890's. W. Bopp & D. ScHuLTZ,
LAw ENFORCEMENT 84 (1972).
75. B. SMITH, supra note 36, at 131.
76. W. Bopp & D. SCHULTZ, supra note 74, at 107.
77. J. SNIDBE & M. HOMA, THE URBAN POLICEMAN IN TRANsmON 5 (1973).
78. G. BERKELEY, ThE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 29 (1969).
SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN
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have risen slowly but steadily since 1910) and promotion on the basis
of criteria related as closely as possible to the police function and goals
have been some of the improvements. 79
Internal controls are perhaps the most important method of regulating police conduct. Officers almost always act individually. Only
in recent years have police departments attempted to improve their
administrative effectiveness. Sinc~ the formation of urban police
forces in the United States, the chain of command has paralleled that
of the military. This practice continues today although it is now less
emphasized.
The major types of external controls are judicial action, police
review boards and ombudsmen. The most significant of these, of
course, is judicial action. There are now six judicial remedies open
to individuals to punish improper police behavior. They include either
civil or criminal suits against individual policemen, actions aganst
the department or municipality, injunctions against certain specified
activities of a department and actions under the federal civil rights
acts. It is possible also to allege a defense to a criminal charge by
showing discriminatory enforcement of the law. Further restraints on
police actions might be made through the use of the exclusionary rule.
The independent police review board was originally established
to hear public grievances against individual officers. Although the
ideas originated in the 1930s, the first board was not established until
1958 in ,Philadelphia. so Impetus for the creation of boards in other
cities in the 1960s came primarily from minority groups who felt they
had little opportunity to have their complaints heard. The police have
been greatly opposed to the formation of such boards. Although the
newness of these boards has precluded the availability of substantial
data on their effectiveness, the subject has generated much exploration. Generally, though, the boards have many inadequacies and their
overall success is in doubt. Sl

m.

THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY

The preceding sections make it clear that the growth of public
police has been characterized by a concomitant growth in controls
over the exercise of police power. What has been the pattern of regula79. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION 147 (1972).
80. W. Bopp & D. ScHuLTZ, supra note 74, at 145.
81. See Berger, Law Enforcement Control: Checks and Balances, 4 CONN. L.
REv. 467 (1971).
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tion and control over private police activity? The following sections,
which represent an update and expansion of the Rand study, set
forth a detailed analysis of developments in the past five years.
The Rand study, for instance, left unanswered the question of how to
evaluate the various systems of private police regulation which do
exist, for the study failed to provide any standard by which the controls imposed on private police by the respective states could be
measured for adequacy or inadequacy. It merely assumed that some
controls were in order and advocated state action on a series of recommendations.
The standard adopted by the authors grows out of the recognition that the American tradition has been characterized by rather extensive control over the public police power. That condition has
convinced the authors that the controls over public police are the
standard by which controls over private police are to be measured.
This is not to suggest that every control or regulation of public police
should be applied identically to private police. But, what is recommended is that the pattern of regulation over private police activity
needs to be substantially parallel to that of public police. The data that
have been assembled in the following sections provide a basis for contrasting present private police regulation with English and American
regulation of public police described above.
Security and Patrol Guards

The various statutory enactments utilize the following terms in
specifying who are security guards: contract guards, patrol guards,
watchmen, armed guards, private guards, patrolmen, special officers,
armored car personnel and alarm service personnel. Though the
nomenclature differs, the fundamental services rendered by these individuals remain the same. Guards "protect or attempt to protect
persons or property from damage, injury, loss or other criminal act."
Patrolmen perform identical functions as guards "but do so at a
number of different physical locations; they usually travel (on foot
or in a vehicle) on public property between these 10cations."82 The
contract guard or patrol agencies referred to in the statutes encompass the individuals, partnerships and corporations which provide
privately employed guards or patrolmen for a fee.
Thus, the security and patrol guards provide one consistent
function for society-protection of property and persons. Yet, an in82. 3 RAND, supra note 2, at 2.
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finite variety of situations arise wherein many different services of
such individuals are required. The diversity of circumstances demands ever-shifting degrees of reaction and responsiveness in order
to furnish adequate protection. It is this activity which is under scruti:
ny, because the absence of uniform and orderly controls can and has
permitted widespread abuse. 83
The abuse or misuse of authority conferred upon security and
patrol guards in part comes from the lack of any type of regulation in
sixteen states. 84 Of the thirty-five states which do mention security
and patrol guards, five states have adopted provisions which are totally devoid of regulatory features. 85 Two of these latter states merely
acknowledge the right of cities and counties to have security and patrol guards and to adopt whatever measures they deem necessary for
control or guidance. 86
When laws do exist, the statutory language is often misleading as
to specific coverage. For example, twenty-two out of the thirty-five
statutes embrace other spheres of the private police industry, e.g., detective agencies and contract investigation. 87 This broadened mantle
has resulted in 9onfusion in applying the statutes and inefficiency in
interpreting them.
The lack of uniform nationwide coverage has also resulted in a
diversity of state regulatory agencies the function of which is to carry
out the letter of their respective state statutes. The Department of
State Police is named as the regulatory agency in five states. 88 Four
other states leave the task to the Secretary of State,89 and five others
turn the job over to the State Board of Private Detectives.9o The rest of
the security and patrol guard agencies and employees are under the
83. For a discussion of control of private police in California in greater depth see
Private Police in Califorma: A Legislative Proposal, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 115
(1975).
84. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming. Note: space limitations preclude citation of all the
state statutes suIVeyed. A full list of the relevant statutes can be obtained by writing to: Administrative Assistant, Golden Gate Law Review, 536 Mission Street.,
San Francisco, California.
85. Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia.
86. Missouri and Virginia. Virginia requires that the city or county have a population of over 150,000.
87. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
88. Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland and Michigan (wherein local public officials must approve the granting of the state license if the business has an office
in that locality).
89. Florida, Nebraska, New York and West Virginia.
90. Hawaii, Nevada, North Carolina, Texas and Vermont
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authority of some other bureaucratic agency in state government. 91
Most state agencies require security and patrol guard agencies,
corporations and other business enterprises to be licensed. The licensing requirement, however, is basically for registration rather than for
regulatory purposes, and often does not include employees of licensees at all.
This means that approximately one-third of the nation neither
recognizes nor accounts for security and patrol guard agencies and
personnel. The rest of the nation, having established some degree of
regulatory policy, is oddly divided as to who should oversee it. In
short, no comprehensive, uniform plan exists relative to licensing and/
or registering one of the most crucial segments of private police. The
nonexistence of this primary control inevitably leads to the absence
or inadequacy of other essential means by which society should watch
its watchmen. This includes both external and internal measures.
To illustrate, it is necessary to return to those states which do have
licensing provisions.
First, the requisites for obtaining a license are cursory. In only
eight states are written examinations required prior to securing a license. 92 In two other states, examinations are required only at the
discretion of the director of the appropriate regulatory agency.93
And, these examinations are generally limited to applicants for a license, notably excluding employees of such persons-the individuals
who have the contact with society.
Of greater import, however, is the prerequisite of some relevant
experience prior to making an application for a license. The length
and type of such experience is greatly varied, indicating an absence of
understanding as to the knowledge and skills necessary for a rational
functioning of the security and patrol industry. Previous employment
in one of the following occupations is mentioned most often as providing the requisite experience: full-time licensed investigator; public
police officer;94 sheriff or deputy; police officer engaged in investiga,

91. Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota (Commissioner of Public Safety); North Dakota (Attorney General); Ohio, Wisconsin (Dep't of Commerce, Licensing Division); California (Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services); New Mexico
(State Bureau of Private Investigation); Arkansas (Investigator Licensing Board);
North Carolina (Private Protective Services Board); Hawaii (Board of Private Detectives and Guards); Nevada (Detective Licensing Board); Georgia, Texas, Vermont
(State Board of Private Detectives); Louisiana, lllinois (Dep't of Registration and
Education); and Maine (Governor).
92. Hawaii, lllinois, Iowa, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio and Texas.
93. California and North Carolina.
94. Illinois and Vermont require that the individual have held a rank higher than
patrolman.
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tive or detective service; private security employee; F.B.I. or state bu~
reau investigator; supervision in industrial security guard or patrol
service; and insurance adjuster.
The length of prior experience required is as diverse as the type
called for. The breakdown is as follows: three states require only one
year of experience;95 seven states ask for two years of experience;96
four states call for three years of experience;97 five states demand four
to five years of experience;98 and three other states have some combi~
nation,99 depending upon the type of experience and whether the ap~
plicant has a college or university education. Nebraska asks for only
some experience consonant with the public interest. New Jersey alone
has established that employees of licensees must also have five years of
experience or training in order to qualify in their field.
The age requirement for securing a license is relatively low when
compared to the length of experience required. For individuals apply~
ing as licensees of security and patrol businesses, six states have estab~
lished a minimum age of eighteen;loo one state defines twenty years of
age as the minimum;lol twelve states call for the applicant to be twen~
ty~one years of age;102 nine states make twenty~five years of age the
minimum. lo3 Only four statutes mention any age requirement for em~
ployees,l°4 with Hawaii requiring the individual to be twenty-one
years of age, Georgia and Wisconsin allowing an employee to be only
eighteen, and Michigan calling for the employee to be twenty-one
years old unless the regulatory agency gives permission to persons
between eighteen and twenty-one. Interestingly, the eighteen-year~
old age minimum for licensees now established in six states have
evolved since the 1970 Rand survey was made, although the experi~
ence requirements have remained constant.
No educational level whatsoever is demanded, except in the Ha~
waii and Michigan statutes wherein licensees must be high school
graduates (or the equivalent) and employees need only have com~
pleted the eighth grade. All other statutes are silent on this subject.
95. California, Maine and New Mexico.
96. Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Carolina and Vermont.
97. Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas.
98. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland and New Jersey.
99. Michigan, North Carolina and West Virginia.
100. California, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Carolina.
101. Maine.
102. Arkansas, Florida, illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont.
103. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York and Wisconsin.
104. Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan and Wisconsin.
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In twenty-four states the applicant must also be a United States
citizen.105 Five states require that the license applicant be a resident of
the state for one year prior to making an application,106 while Connecticut, Georgia and Minnesota simply ask the applicant where his
or her residence has been for the past five years. Except in Georgia
and New Jersey, where both licensees and employees must be United
States citizens, employees are not mentioned.

For completion of the licensing procedure, twenty-five states demand one to three photographs and/or sets of fingerprints from the
license applicant. 107 But only five states call for prospective employees of the licensee to submit these items to the licensing regulatory
agency.10S The photographs and fingerprints are used by the regulatory agency, or some other designated body, to assist in running a
criminal records check on the applicant. The above, along with three
to five reference letters (again, required only for license applicants)
attesting to "character," apparently provide the regulatory agencies
with sufficient information to pass judgment for either granting or
denying the license.
Denial of a license may result from nonfulfillment of some or all
of the aforementioned requirements, depending on the statutory language. In addition, some states refuse to issue licenses on other
grounds. "In many states grounds are characterized by phraseology
such as 'not of good moral character, integrity, competency, reputation or honesty.' "109 Other bases frequently applied to deny licenses
include prior felony convictions, falsified application information, a
prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, having been
adjudged mentally defective, receipt of a dishonorable discharge
from military service, illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon,
and conviction of certain other crimes constituting misdemeanors.
Five states are absolutely silent regarding any basis for denying a license. l1O Another ten states specify that only a felony conviction or a
105. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
106. Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Texas (Texas actually requires state citizenship),
and Wisconsin. Nevada requires the license applicant to have resided in the state
for only six months.
107. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia.
108. Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina and Ohio.
109. 3 RAND, supra note 2, at 9.
110. Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee and Virginia.
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lack of honesty, truthfulness and the like would serve as grounds for
withholding a license. ll1 The rest of the statutes have varying combinations of the above, with approximately only one-third of the states
setting forth fully comprehensive and meaningful standards which
must be adhered to.
Generally, the grounds for suspension or revocation of a license
are very similar for denial of a license, although of five states the bases
for suspension or revocation are much broader and more detailed
than those for denial. 112 Failure to comply with and violation of the
respective licensing provisions (e.g., falsification on applications, not
maintaining a proper bond) are the most frequently. cited causes for
suspension or revocation. Most states provide for a public hearing on
the alleged offense as established by administrative procedure. From
available data, the extent to which this avenue is utilized for rectification or punishment appears unclear. 113 However, when provided for,
this method of control could and should be employed to maintain a
watchful eye on private security guard and patrol agencies and their
employees.
Two other methods of control which exist in varying degrees encompass the amount of a license fee and the amount of a bond which
must be posted upon securing a license. Individuals who obtain a license must pay an initial fee ranging from $10 to $750, with a renewal
rate running about half of the original fee. The fee depends, too, upon
whether an individual or a corporation is seeking licensing. The average fee per individual licensee appears to be in the $100-to-$200
bracket. Employees are required (though infrequently) to pay a
nominal $2-to-$10 registration fee. Louisiana's license fee runs from
$150 to $200, depending on the amount of gross receipts of the business. Three states do not mention fees at all.11 4
Twenty-eight states will issue the license only after a surety bond
has been posted with the regulatory agency. As with fees, the amount
of the bond or insurance depends upon whether an individual or a
corporation is applying for a license. For an individual, the amount
required usually ranges from $2,000 to $3,000. Agencies or corporations have a higher rate: eight states require from $2,000 to $5,111. Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
112. Florida, illinois, Indiana, Nevada and Texas.
113. Penalties now provide for a fine of anywhere from $100 to $1,000 and/or
six months to two years imprisonment.
114. Missouri, Oklahoma and Virginia.
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000;115 another eight require $5,000;116 and eleven more states demand a $10,000 bondY7 Vermont requires a $25,000 bond,l1S and
Ohio offers a choice-a $400,000 bond, or insurance of $100,000
per person and $300,000 per occurrence for personal injury, plus
$100,000 property damage coverage. 119 It appears that the high
bonding and insurance requirement is designed to cover abuse of
authority by licensees and their agents if complaints are lodged against
them. The rationale is that the more money it takes to safeguard or
control licensing standards,the less likely it is that the personnel will
misuse their authority.
Bonding is not, however, a substitute for proper training programs and curricula, which could provide an infinitely greater
amount of regulatory control over the actions of security personnel
and their employees. As of July, 1974, only four states mention any
kind of training as a prerequisite. Michigan simply prescribes training
for licensed in-house security forces through the department of state
police. 120 In Ohio training is obligatory onlY,if the locality requires the
security personnel to obtain a private police commission. 121 California merely says firearms training will become mandatory under new
regulations. Georgia, however, requires each licensee to have a competent training officer and an adequate training program. 122
As is apparent, though, the internal controls are nebulous, sporadic, diverse, and wholly inadequate for the type of service and protection which security and guard agencies hold themselves out as providing. This is indeed crucial because only three states expressly deny
security personnel legal authority above that of an ordinarycitizen.123
Delaware and Hawaii grant their guard or patrol personnel the powyr
to make arrests, while most other statutes extend this type of police authority to guards only when they are on the property of the place
.
where employed.
Twelve states do permit guards to carry concealed or dangerous
115. California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota and West Virginia.
116. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota and
North Carolina.
117. Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
118. V. STAT. ANN. § 35-9502.
119. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4749.03(A)(4) (1973).
120. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1'85(31) (1967).
'
121. OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 109.71, 109.78 (Additional Supp. 1973). This
commission is unconnected with any state licensing or registration requirements for
,private police except for armed personnel at educational institutions.
122. GA. STATS. ANN. § 84-6505(b)(6) (1974).
123. Arkansas. California and Ohio.
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weapons if an additional license is obtained. 124 The other states are
silent on this subject. Eleven states permit security and patrol guards
to have special identification cards, badges, and uniforms;125 four permit identification cards and badges;126 and six permit special identification cards. 127 Due to all these privileges, private security and patrol
guards assume the guise of public law enforcement officers, but are
not subject to the regulations which have been established to control
the public police.
Private Detectives and Investigation Agencies

Private detectives and investigation agencies are a familiar part
of the growing numbers of individuals and businesses engaged in the
private police industry. On a contract fee basis, investigative services
that utilize the techniques available to public investigative agencies
such as the F.B.I., state, and municipal police forces are available to
the private sector. While the scope of the public police investigator's
role is limited both to those areas serving the public need and by the
amount of tax dollars allocated, and is subject to restraints such as the
protection of constitutional rights, similar limitations are not placed
on the private investigator. This absence of restraints is illustrated by
the lack of uniformity in regulation by the individual states.
Traditionally, private detective services have been used to obtain information on individuals not readily or routinely available
through public sources. Currently, and most frequently, this information is solicited for either business or litigation purposes. While the
need for private investigative services is real, the sophistication and
range of modem investigation devices demands the establishment of
standards equally applied and adhered to by both public and private
police. Otherwise, abuses, particularly in the area of invasion of privacy, are bound to occur. This need for uniformity becomes greater
when viewed in light of state statutes that permit only ex-police officers the privilege of applying for private detective status.
Where every public police force regardless of its nature is subject
to state regulation, private detectives and investigative agencies are
124. California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
125. California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Ohio. The uniforms must
be "dissimilar" to those worn by public police, and the badges are supposed to state
the company or agency for which the private security personnel works.
126. Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa and Pennsylvania.
127. Florida, lllinois, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota and Texas.

457
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1975

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7

GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW

regulated at the state level in only thirty-five states.128 Whereas the
local or state police commissioner is always responsible for the regulation and administration of the local and state public police, regulation
of the private detective industry is delegated to a variety of state -agencies. Consequently, a variety of purposes are sought by the regulatory
statutes, few of which tend to establish and maintain standards on an
equal par with those required of their public counterparts. The types
of agencies responsible for regulating licensing of this industry are as
follows:
Type of Agency
Public law enforcement agencies 129
Revenue collecting agencies130
Private detective boards131
Secretary of State132
Attorney General133
Governor134
Miscellaneous agencies135
None at state leveP36

Number of States

12
8
6

5
2
1
3
4

One~third

of the states regulate these services primarily as a revenue raising device by requiring a license to do business. An equal
proportion utilize law enforcement agencies for regulation. While
statutes may be comparatively comprehensive in scope, choice of the
regulating agency greatly affects the manner, sphere and direction of
such regulation. The probability that a revenue collecting agency will
have the expertise, interest and facilities to enforce the statute with
respect to effectively regulating standards is minimal. Use of government agencies whose primary purpose is other than regulation of law
128. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New JerGeorgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina.
Ten states have no regulatory laws at all: Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. Four states regulate, but leave the licensing to cities or non-state level agencies: Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Virginia and Wyoming. Two states, Alabama and Alaska, regulate at
the state level, but solely for the purpose of requiring a license and fee.
129. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina and South Carolina.
130. Alabama, Alaska, California, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and
Wisconsin.
131. Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Vermont.
132. Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska and West Virginia.
133. Kansas and North Dakota.
134. Maine.
.
135. Illinois, Maryland and the District of Columbia.
136. Pennsylvania, RhOde Island, Virginia and Wyoming.
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enforcement personnel further indicates an absence of proper concern for the quality of statutorily established regulatory efforts.
Six states137 use private detective boards comprised of individuals usually chosen from within the field to regulate the industry. Since
the effectiveness of the statute is dependent upon the individuals chosen to enforce it, the use of such individuals tends to promote the status quo rather than create an impetus for the upgrading of standards
and qualifications within the industry. On ·the other hand, the use of
law enforcement agencies as the regulatory body gives the breadth of
experience necessary to create and maintain parallel standards for
public and private investigators, and at the same time, to utilize its
expertise to provide a thorough evaluation of licensees according to
statutory requirements.
Finally, regulation through such disparate state agencies prohibits any meaningful and effective compilation of data on the nature
and character of the private detective and investigative field, both
within the individual states and on a national basis. National statistics
are consequently inaccurate and incomplete since data can be obtained
only through cumulatively studying each of the states that does regulate this field and hypothesizing about the twelve states138 that do not.
Further inaccuracies arise because the majority of statutes are
ambiguous as to precisely who must obtain a license. In four states,139
a licensee may employ unlicensed detectives without registering those
individuals. South Carolina alone expressly provides that the licensee
is the only member of the business to perform investigations. 140
The Degree of Detective or Investigator RegUlation
An examination of the relevant state laws reveals that regulatory
provisions exist in the general areas of individual qualifications, industrial standards, and revenue collecting requirements. Analysis
of the degree of regulation in each of these areas by priority of concern was determined by the frequency with which a specific qualification was regulated. The priority of concern is indicative of th~
overall purpose and effectiveness of the statutes.
At the outset, it should be noted that although thirty-five states
technically regulate this field in some manner on the state level, regu137.
138.
139.
140.

Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Vermont.
See note 128 supra.
Arizona, North Dakota, Virginia and West Virginia.
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 56-64/?1-.17 (1974).
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lation in two other states is limited solely to the extent that a fee be
paid in exchange for a license.141 The method of regulation varies according to whether an investigative agency or individual private detective business is involved. Investigative agencies must be licensed in
twenty-four states;142 in twelve states employees of these agencies
must be registered or licensed, or must meet specific qualifications. u3
Private detective businesses are licensed in sixteen states,144 and employees must be either registered or licensed, or must meet specific
qualifications in fifteen states.145
The most frequently cited requirement of the thirty-seven states
is the payment of ·a license fee. 146 Fees range from $10 up to $750, and
depend on the nature of the license, agency or individual. Although
the processing of the license and the fee payment do not seem monetarily or financially prohibitive, the range of fees paid is inadequate to
cover the cost of effectively regulating the field. Basic costs like record
keeping and minimal evaluation of prospective licensees are barely
covered by license fees. In general, license fees appear to be regulatory, but in fact are not. This contention is further supported by the fact
that in sixteen states147 additional minimal fees are charged for license renewal, registering employees; examination and application
fees.
The license period is of next greatest importance. Licenses are
valid for one year in twenty-two states148 and two years in ten
states,149 with three states not specifying the time period involved.150
141. See note 128 supra.
.
142. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Florida, DIinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
143. Arkansas, California, lllinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
144. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas and West Virginia.
145. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Texas.
146. All states but Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming.
147. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, lllinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
148. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Da,}cota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
149. California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York and Pennsylvania.
150. Nebraska, North carolina and Rhode Island.
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Duration of registration periods of employees and registration fees for
employees are seldom stated in the codes.
Revocation of a license is of equal importance, and thirty-five
states prescribe conditions under which a license may be revoked. 151
Grounds for revocation most often cited are: (1) misrepresentation
on the license application; (2) "just cause"; and (3) conviction of a
felony. In nine states revocation provisions apply equally to employee
registrants and licensees.152 However, in the remaining states, the
statutory provisions are generally unclear as to whether requirements
are applicable to the licenSed agency or the registered employee or
both. Judicial interpretation is lacking in this area, and presumably
revocation statutes would apply only to licensees unless clearly stated
otherwise. Nevertheless, revocation standards do establish clear ways
and means to promote and develop expertise in the field. Eight states
provide a mechanism, usually an administrative hearing, to formalize
the revocation and provide a right to appeal in a state court of law.153
The extent to which revocation is used and of its practicality as a
viable regulatory tool cannot be determined from the statutes; but the
provision decidedly exists, no doubt with the expectation that its threat
may be as effective as its use.
Statutory provisions in thirty-four states establish penalties for
violation of the statutes.154 The penalty usually stipulates a fine
and/or imprisonment. Fines range from not less than $500 to not
more than $5,000, and imprisonment from six months to a maximum
of one year. Unless the statute is silent, violation is usually classified as
a misdemeanor. Penalties are generally imposed for violating the code
provisions, but are also imposed for falsifying application material,
impersonating a law enforcement officer, disobeying court orders,
carrying dangerous weapons illegally, misleading the public, using
illegal means to collect debts, manufacturing evidence, failing to maintain bond coverage, and using unnecessary force or violence.
151. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
152. Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
153. Georgia, Indiana, New York, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
the District of Columbia.
154. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin.
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The posting of a bond or the purchase of a minimum amount of
insurance is the fourth most regulated area, provided for by thirtythree states. 155 Insurance and bond amounts vary from $1,000 to $2,000 in the majority of states. However, the statutes dealing with this
requirement seldom specify whether the bond or insurance amount
need be maintained per year or per incident. Fourteen states require
that a minimum bond or insurance coverage of $10,000 or more be
posted with the appropriate state authority.156 In light of the extensive
injury that can be anticipated from the nature of private investigative
work, these minimal bonding provisions are clearly intended as part
of the cost of doing business rather than as a protective measure for
the public that may be seriously harmed. States that have utilized the
bond statutes to effectuate an adequate and responsible protection
mechanism for the public are discussed in the last section of this
article. 157
The fifth most regulated area is the requirement of a criminal
record check of the licensee. Where the licensee is an investigation
agency, the criminal record check is required of the officers of the
company only. No individual convicted of a felony is eligible for a
license under the statutes. Although the licensee in thirty-one states
must meet this requirement,158 twelve states additionally require that
employees of the licensee have no record of a felony conviction. 159 In
fifteen states where employees are registered or licensed, a separate
criminal record check must be made prior to receiving registration of
licensing. 16o Recognizing that, as of 1969, an estimated 32,000 private detectives were licensed and that the licensing requirements are
enforced by diverse state agencies whose sole function is seldom regu155. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin.
156. Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine (non-residen~ only), Michigan (corporations only), Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin (agencies only).
157. See text accompanying notes 247-52 infra. In addition, New Mexico requires all claims against bonds or insurers to be reported.
158. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont
and West Virginia.
159. Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey New
'
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
160. Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, lllinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland Nebras~a, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and WisconSill.

462

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol5/iss2/7

30

Dralla: Private Police

WHO'S WATCHING THE WATCHMAN?

lation of the private detective industry, it is unlikely that accurate and
criminal records checks are regularly conducted. 161
Because statutory requirements for licensing such as fees, length
of license, grounds for revocation, penalties for violation of the statutes, and criminal records checks are those most often enacted, their
frequency indicates a concern for administrative procedures. And although these requirements regulate the field in a bureaucratic manner,
actual controls through statutes are seldom achieved without additional provisions regarding the personal qualifications of the licensee.

In this area of personal qualifications, age of the licensee is most
notable. Twenty-seven states have minimum age limits. Eighteen is
the minimum age in six states,162 twenty-one in eleven states,163 and
twenty-five in nine states. 164 One state requires that the applicant
have reached the age of majority.165 Several states provide that if the
licensee is an agency, twenty-five is the minimum age, whereas employees or registrants may be younger.166
The requirement of prior experience in twenty-seven states
would appear to raise the minimum age de facto.167 Generally, the
prior experience requirement entails three years' experience as a
peace officer on a police force. Two states require that the rank of
detective be achieved. 16s That many ex-public policemen enter this
field either as private detectives or members of an investigative agency
no doubt adds to the quality and expertise of the industry because of
the rigorous training required of public peace officers. The prior experience requirement is therefore probably the most substantial control
the states exert over the quality of their licensed private detectives and
investigative agencies, considering that three states169 require specialized training and only three other states170 establish minimal educational standards as prerequisites.
161. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 11, Table 1. It should be emphasized that the figures used by the Rand study included data only through 1969.
162. California, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Carolina.
163. Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas and Vermont.
164. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
.
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-33-13 (1974).
166. Connecticut, Hawaii, Texas and Wisconsin.
167. Arizona, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Dlinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
168. Maryland and Massachusetts.
169. Hawaii, Ohio and South Carolina.
170. Hawaii, Michigan and West Virginia.
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In addition, thirty states control the quality of the licensees by
specifying grounds for denying the application. 171 Grounds for denial often include a felony conviction or the lack of good moral character. Interestingly enough, no state lists personal incompetence or lack
of expertise in the field as a basis for denial, although eleven states
require that a qualifying examination be taken.172 Sixteen states require references from three to five individuals who reside in the area
where the licensee intends to work.173 Other means of control by the
regulatory agencies exist in the form of a statutory requirement that
applicants be state residents or United States citizens. Private detectives and officers of investigative agencies must possess United States
citizenship in twenty-six states.174 However, only eight states require
that licensees be state residents. 175
·Finally, twenty-eight states have enacted fingerprinting requirements for private detectives and licensees of investigative agencies. 176
This requirement apparently is the method used to prevent persons
with felony convictions from being licensed. However, registrants or
employees who perform detective or investigative functions appear
exempt from supplying fingerprints in twelve of the states which require fingerprints from licensees. 177 An additional method of identification in twenty-five states is the requirement that photographs be
submitted with the application. 178 Again, however, employees and
registrants operating under a licensee are not subject to this qualification. The use of photographs and fingerprints also enables a state to
171. Arizona. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia. Florida. Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana. Iowa. Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota. Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota. Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
172. California, Hawaii, illinois, Iowa. Nevada, North Carolina. New York,
North Dakota. Ohio, Texas and Vermont.
173. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada. New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina. Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
174. Arizona. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida. Georgia, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota. OhiO, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
175. Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana. Michigan, Nevada. Texas and Wisconsin.
176. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida. Georgia,
Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota. Nebraska,
Nevada. New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota. Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia.
177. Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota. Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota. South Carolina and West Virginia.
178. Arizona, Arkansas, California. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia.
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prevent the transfer of a license obtained by a qualified person or
-agency to one which would not meet the statutory requirements.
The statutory controls affecting personnel quality do place restrictions on entry and practice in this field. Nevertheless, these requirements are minimal in terms of guaranteeing the public and the
purchaser of the services private detectives or investigative agents
comparable in quality to those provided by the F.B.I., state police
or local police forces. The mere absence of a felony conviction seems
to be the most common criterion used to determine eligibilty to enter
this field.
The majority of public investigation officers are used to obtain
information relating to criminal activities which could result in the
possible loss or curtailment of an individual's civil liberties. On the
other hand, the private detective's work is limited only to those subjects which the purchaser pays to have investigated. The use of this
information is thus not confined to the legal and judicial community,
but can pervade every level of human activity and interaction. Therefore, the minimal controls found in this statutory survey, even where
most comprehensive, as in Texas or Arizona, are inadequate to maintain quality in this field on a par with that prev~g in the public
realm.
A major area of potential regulation governs the interaction between the licensee and the public. Whether or not statutory requirements for weapons licenses,. identification cards, uniforms and
badges constitute effective controls over the public police, they do
alert the public to their existence against which protective measures
may be privately taken. However, although the phrase "private dective" implies that investigative services are being supplied for private
purposes, four states have granted statutory powers exceeding those
of private citizens to the licensees. 179 The measure of this extraordinary citizen power ranges from full police authority to simply the
power to stop and arrest. Only three states have enacted statutes
designed to emphasize that private detectives and detective agencies
possess on greater police powers than the private citizen. 180
The lack of appropriate and adequate controls becomes more
significant in view of the fact that only fifteen states require that an
179. Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii and South Carolina.
180. Arkansas, Indiana and Kansas.
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additional license be obtained for the use of a weapon. 181 Three have
restrictions on the use of weapons,182 and three others require a proficiency test prior to licensing. 183 Although the nature of investigative
work may sometimes create a need for weapons, their use is not always
essential. This lack of control and concern by the regulatory agencies
indicates the potential danger presented by unskilled, armed private
detectives in our midst.
Twenty-two states requITe that the private detective carry an
identification card which is issued with the license;184 thirteen states
provide for the issuing of a badge;185 and nine permit uniforms to be
worn. 186 Since the nature of investigative work frequently entails an
element of secrecy, it seems inevitable that only the carrying of identification cards or badges would be utilized by the licensee, and these
need not be worn in clear view. Thus, the degree of protection provided the public by these statutory provisions is easily defeated by their
unsuitability and inappropriateness to the function being regulated.
Finally, regulating the quality of the services offered in the field
of private investigation must reflect the training offered its personnel.
And significantly, it must be noted that only three states have enacted
any statutes in this area. 187 The training that is provided exists because of the needs perceived by the individual licensees. Consequently,
the scope and substance of these training programs vary from the simplistic to the comprehensive, depending upon the profit to be realized
from a minimum level of performance. However, no statutes require
training to be on a par with training required of public officials engaged in parallel activities. Thus, the most influential means of
regulating by the states has never been fully instituted. Licensees are
approved on a perfunctory application of -bureaucratic procedures
rather than on a critical evaluation of qualifications necessary to the
field.
181. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florid3., Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina and Wisconsin.
182. Georgia, New Mexico and South Carolina.
183. Georgia, Maryland and South Carolina.
184. Arizona, AFkausas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas.
185. Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. New York spe~
cifically forbids badges to be issued or used.
186. Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York and Ohio.
187. Georgia, Ohio and South Carolina.
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Insurance Adjusters

Insurance adjusters are regulated by twenty-eight states,188 and
in twenty-five states the regulation is by an agency at the state level. l89
In twenty-three states the agency responsible is the insurance commission or commissioner.loo
The need for the regulation of insurance adjusters derives from
the services that they perform. In general, insurance adjusters are employed by either insurance companies or by private individuals to investigate clalms made against a policy. Since the essence of the work
entails investigation, which are the same skills and techniques associated with detectives and investigators, insurance adjusters are
within the scope of this article.
In contrast to the licensing of the private detective and investigative agency field, nineteen states grant licenses to insurance adjusters
only after the applicant has passed a written examination. lOl Since
study materials for the examination topics are provided with the examination fee, this requirement establishes some minimum and uniform qualification for all adjusters within a state. Although this regulatory requirement does not presume to require specific educational
training or experience, four states require specific educational backgrounds and training. 102 Seventeen states require prior experience as
a qualification for the license, which indicates a partial degree of control over the quality and ability of the licensees through the licensing
requirements. 193
The states further control the quality of the licensees by establishing grounds for denial and revocation. In twenty states, misrepresentation, "just cause," and dishonesty are among the most frequently
188. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
189. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
190. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and
Wyoming.
191. Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Washington.
192. Arizona, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Wyoming.
193. Alabama, Alaska. Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, .utah, Vermont, Washington and
Wyoming.
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cited reasons for revocation. 194 Grounds for denial are established in
nineteen states and include conviction for a felony or crime involving
moral turpitude, and failure to pass the written examination.195 Fifteen states have established statutory penalties for infractions of these
and other statutory requirements. 196 It is interesting to note that fourteen states require a personal character check prior to licensing,197
whereas only two states require a criminal record check as a means of
controlling the quality of individuals in the field. 198

In addition, with respect to personal qualifications, eighteen
states require that the applicant have reached a specific age: seven
states require twenty-one years,199 eight states eighteen years,200 one
state sets twenty as the minimum age,201 and two states establish the
age of majority as the requisite age. 202 Nine states require that the
applicant be a resident of the licensing state,203 and one state requires
that the applicant be a United States citizen. 204 Finally, only one state
requires that an applicant submit a photograph and fingerprints as a
requirement for the license. 205
The period for which a license is issued varies from one to two
years, but is statutorily specified in nineteen states. 206 In these nineteen states, a license fee is also required, but this requirement is minimal in that none of the fees exceeded $10. These two requirements
reflect the bureaucratic nature of the licensing provisions. In twelve
states there is a statutory requirement for bonding or liability insurance up to an amount of $5,000 207 whereas three states require $10,194. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Washington.
195. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Washington.
196. Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and
Washington.
, 197.. Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming.
198. California and New Mexico.
199. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, Utah and Vermont.
200. California, Maine, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia
and Washington.
201. HAWAll REv. STAT. § 431-467.
202. New Mexico and Wyoming.
203. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Wash·
ington and Wyoming.
204. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.865(b) (1974).
205. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 7525(f) (West 1974).
206. ~na, Arkansas,. Calif0!.frla, Florida, -!lawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New MeXICO, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvarua, Rhode Island, South Carolina
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming.
. '
207. California, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington.
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000 as a minimum amount of insurance. 208 The public is thus provided some assurance that the licensee is a reputable business person;
whether it protects the public from incompetent insurance adjusters is
·unknown.
In two states an identification card is issued,209 and one state
requires that a pocket card be carried by the licensee and displayed
upon request. 210 In addition, one state describes the limits of the legal
authority of an insurance adjuster. 211 Only one state exempts both
licensees and employees from obtaining a license to own or carry
weapons and requires no training in their use.212 Again, the rest of
the states are silent.
In conclusion, the most effective controls exerted by the states
exist at the state level through the insurance commission or commissioner. The most effective means of attempting genuine control
would seem to be through the requirement that an applicant for a
license 'pass a written examination. Since the quality of the examinations themselves could not be evaluated from the statutory survey, the
effectiveness of this requirement cannot be precisely ascertained.
Moreover, the connection between a certain level of achievement on a
written examination and the quality of the work to be performed by an
insurance adjuster is not conclusive as to the examination's effectiveness as a method of regulation. Nevertheless, the written examination
provides an objective means of evaluating the qualifications of individuals employed to investigate insurance claims.
Polygraph Examiners

It is becoming increasingly important to recognize that polygraph examiners perform police-like functions and are vested with
police-like powers. This law-enforcement classification derives from
the fact that a polygraph examination generally consists of an investigation which might be regarded both as an invasion of one's right to
privacy and an abrogation of one's right against self-incrimination.
Nevertheless, lie detector tests, commonly administered by private polygraph examiners, are thought to be of great practical utility
in the areas of internal and criminal investigations and personnel se208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Maine, Oklahoma (public adjusters only) and Vermont.
California and Washington.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 7533 (West 1974).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7538 (West 1974).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12031(b), 12031.5 (West Supp. 1975).
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lection and screening. 213 Despite their utility in these areas, the nega~
tive consequences of these tests have been such that seventeen states
have adopted statutes forbidding an individual or business to require
submission to a polygraph examination as a condition of employ~
ment. 214
The belief that a polygraph examination might constitute an un~
warranted invasion of an individual's privacy was the basis of section
432.2 of the California Labor Code. That section forbids an empl<;>yer
to demand or require any applicant for employment or any present
employee to submit to a polygraph examination. However, it has been
held that an employer may "request" or "permit" an employee to sub~
mit to a lie detector test. While the lie detector test may not, in California, be used as a condition of employment, it is frequently used as a
means of facilitating examinations that might have been conducted in
another manner.215 The majority of states do not forbid the administration of polygraph examinations as a condition of employment, al~
though organized labor has openly opposed this practice as a violation
of individual rights.
While the results of lie detector tests are generally inadmissible
as evidence at trial (unless the parties stipulate otherwise)216 lie detector examinations are used extensively as a part of pre-trial investigatory procedure. The proponents of polygraph examinations urge
that innocent persons may be eliminated as suspects and thus be
spared any further fear, embarrassment or inconvenience. At the
same time, polygraph examination expedites the search for the guilty
person. Advocates of the use of the polygraph maintain that "[t]he
use and availability of lie detector examinations will reduce the extent
of third degree practices, especially among innocent suspects."217
Insofar as lie detectors playa significant role in criminal investigation and polygraph examination techniques are rapidly becoming
more sophisticated, it is essential that this profession be controlled
and regulated on a statewide basis, especially since it is generally
agreed that extensive supervised training is indispensable for proper
administration and accurate interpretation of the lie detector test. 218
213. F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CruMlNAL INTERROGATION 110 (3d
ed.1953).
214. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Virginia and Washington.
215. 43 ATIY. GEN. OP. 25 (1964).
216. United States v. De Betham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
217. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 213, at 110.
218. [d. at 115.
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Nevertheless, only sixteen states have adopted legislation requiring the licensing and regulation of polygraph examiners.219 It is
astonishing that a profession which requires a high degree of skill and
which has such potentially far-reaching consequences is virtually unregulated in over two-thirds of the states. In thirty-four states, a person
with no training, experience, or other qualifications can lawfully administer polygraph examinations which have a significant impact on
criminal proceedings. This is especially noteworthy in light of the fact
that experts in the area of polygraph examination maintain that the
qualifications and training of an examiner are the critical factors in
assessing the accuracy and reliability of lie detector tests. 220
The sixteen states that do regulate polygraph examiners have
quite similar licensing procedures and qualification requirements. In
seven of those states, the industry is controlled by a polygraph examiner's board.221 In the other nine states, the profession is regulated
by a larger agency, such as the secretary of state, the attorney general
or the department of public safety. Although all of the statutes are
similar in other respects; the agency can have a profound affect on the
enforcement of the regulation. A smaller, more specialized agency
is a more effective means of enforcing regulations than a larger agency
which oversees the licensing of many professions and which of necessity can do little more than collect license fees. Although no comparative data are currently available on enforcement in different
states, it appears desirable that licensing be controlled by a specialized
board of polygraph examiners who are familiar with and qualified in
the administration of lie detector tests.
All states which license polygraph examiners require the licensee to be a resident of the United States. All have a minimum age
limit, ranging from eighteen to twenty-five years. It seems doubtful
that an eighteen-year-old would be qualified to administer an examination which requires a rudimentary knowledge, of psychology and
physiology, and preferably a college education and some investigative
experience.
Five states require that an applicant submit a photograph prior
to the issuance of a license,222 and eight states require that the appli219. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah and Virginia.
220. F. lNBAU & J. REID, supra note 213, at 114.
221. Alabama, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma and
Texas.
222. FlOrida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and Utah.
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cant be fingerprinted223 to insure that the license is not transferred to
an unqualified examiner. Six states have absolutely no provisions for
the identification of licensees. 224 The period for which a license is
issued is one year in all states. License fees range from $10 for an
intern licensee to $250 for a private polygraph examiner, depending
on the state in which the license is issued.
Although the requirements differ slightly from state to state, all
sixteen states which license polygraph examiners have some minimum requirement as to training, education or prior investigative experience. Eleven of the states require that the polygraph examiner
have a B.A. degree or five years of prior investigatory experience. 225
In those states which require only a high school diploma, some training at a polygraph examiner's school or participation in an internship
program is necessary. The duration of these programs ranges from six
weeks to six months. Twelve of the sixteen states require that the applicant pass a written examination. 226
In every state that licenses polygraph examiners, there are specific grounds for denial, suspension and revocation of licenses. The
grounds given in Alabama Revised Statutes Section 297(22fff) are
typical:
The board may refuse to issue or may suspend or revoke a
license on anyone or more of the following grounds:
(1) For failing to inform a subject to be exam-

ined that his participation in the examination is voluntary; or
(2) For failing to inform a subject to be examined as to the nature of the examination; or
(3) Failing to inform the subject of the results
of the examination requested; or
( 4) Willful disregard or violation of this chapter
or of any regulation or rule issued pursuant
thereto, including, but not limited to, willfully making a false report concerning an
examination for polygraph examination purposes; or
223. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia
and Utah.
224. Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma and South Carolina.
225. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and Utah.
226. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas.
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(5) Willfully aiding or abetting another in the
violation of this chapter or any regulation or
rule issued pursuant thereto; or
(6) Having demonstrated unworthiness or incompetency to act as a polygraph examiner
as defined by this chapter; or
(7) Making any willful misrepresentation or
false promises or causing to be permitted
any false or misleading advertisement for
the purpose of directly obtaining business or
trainees; or
(8) Allowing one's license under this chapter to
be used by any unlicensed person in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or
(9) If the holder of any license has been adjudged guilty of the commission of a felony
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; or
(10) Where the license holder has been adjudged
an habitual drunkard or mentally incompetent as provided in the probate code; or
(11) Material misstatement in the application for
the original license or in the application of
any renewal license under this chapter; or
(12) Failing, within a reasonable time, to provide
information requested by the secretary as
the result of a formal complaint to the board
which indicates a violation of this chapter.

In all sixteen states, there is a penalty for failure to comply with
the provisions of the act. The penalties vary from a misdemeanor to a
$1,000 fine and/or twelve months maximum imprisonment.
Statutory regulation of polygraph examiners is markedly different from regulation of other private police professions. While most
professions are regulated, albeit inefficiently in most states,· polygraph examiners are regulated in only one-third of the states. 227 Although sparse, the regulation is consistent and comparatively thorough in all of the sixteen states. Most of the regulations are relatively
recent, and several of the states that regulate polygraph examiners by
statute have done so within the past four years.
227. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Da,kota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah and Virginia.
.
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Railroad Police

Forty-one states in the United States have enacted statutes which
authorize railroad companies to hire private citizens or to designate
their own employees as private railroad police. 228 In these states, railroad conductors, brakemen and ticket agents, who have no police
training, are vested with police powers.
Although private police and railway police share many common
powers above those of the ordinary citizen, private railroad police
were historically intended to serve a different purpose than most other
private police. While most of the areas of private police protection are
relatively ~ew, and while the statutes that describe the limits of their
powers have been enacted within the past twenty years, the statutes
that provide for private police protection of railroads are much older.
Many of these statutes were enacted in the late nineteenth century and
vest steamship and express companies with the same powers as railroads to appoint private police. The original purpose of the statuteS
which authorized police for transportation companies was twofold.
First, railway police were supposed to protect cargo being shipped
over long distances. Second, railway police were a helpful solution
to the jurisdictional problems that arose when crimes were committed
on railroads operating in several states.
Although times have changed, the broad powers of railroad police and conductors have not. In all forty-one states authorizing railway police, the power of these private employees greatly exceeds that
of ordinary citizens. In none of the forty-one states is there a regulatory agency which deals exclusively with railroad police. In fact,
railroads have received a virtually unrestricted grant of police power.
The typical statute authorizes a railroad company to apply to the
governor of the state to have any number of its employees appointed
as railroad police. The police are paid by the railroad company, and
the company is liable for the acts of the employee. The railroad
policeman on railroad property typically possesses all the arrest and
detention powers of a public policeman.
In only two of the forty-one states is there a state residency requirement for railroad police. 229 Three require that a railroad policeman be a citizen of the United States.230 The only state which has an
228. All states except Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis·
souri, Nebraska and New York.
229. Michigan and Montana.
230. Massachusetts, Montana and Wisconsin.
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age requirement for railroad police is Michigan, where the minimum
age is eighteen years. 231 Since the training required to be a railroad
conductor is drastically different from that which would be necessary
for one who performs police functions, it is possible for an unqualified eighteen-year-old citizen of any state to be designated a railroad
policeman. There are no requirements that photographs or fingerprints be submitted at the time of registration. Considering the broad
powers that these officers have and the potential abuse of power that
could be avoided, requiring them to submit photographs and fingerprints at the time of registration would appear reasonable.
Other than Arizona, which requires railroad police to meet the
same minimum qualifications as public police,232 no state requires
any prior experience or minimum educational level. Only two states,
Ohio and Indiana, require training for railroad policemen. Ohio requires twenty years of investigatory experience or participation in a
special training program.233
Michigan and New Jersey are the only states that require a railroad policeman to undergo a criminal records check before being allowed to act as a policeman. 234 Presumably, an ex-felon might be designated as a railroad policeman with peace officer's powers in any of
the other thirty-eight states which authorize railway police but do not
require crime checks.
In none of the forty-one states are there criteria for the denial Qf
status as a railroad policeman. Presumably, the railroad has total discretion. Indiana and West Virginia are the only states which provide
for the revocation of one's designation as a railroad policeman. The
grounds for revocation include misconduct, incompetence, drunkenness, neglect of duty, or gross immorality.235 Assuming that railroad
police will continue to exist, similar grounds for revocation must be
established in all states, especially those which authorize a virtually
unrestricted grant of police power.
Ohio alone requires payment of a fine for train conductors who
have abused their police power. The amount of the fine ranges from
$5 to $25. 236 Considering the abuses that are possible when a private
citizen is authorized to carry a gun and to make arrests, as railroad
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

MICH. COMPo LAws § 470.51 (1967).
ARIz. STAT. § 40-856 (1974).
Omo REv. CoDB ANN. § 109.78 (1973).

Michigan and New Jersey.
Indiana and West Virginia.
Omo REv. CoDB ANN. § 4973.99(B) (1973).
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police are, this penalty schedule is hardly adequate to deter abuses
of law.
Kentucky, Ohio and New Jersey require a $5 license fee. In
Michigan the fee is $2. These are the only states that issue licenses.
Since the cost of licenses is supposed to cover the cost incurred in the
enforcement of regulations, such an insignificant fee can hardly be
classified as regulatory.
Nine states require that a bond be posted to cover any civi1liabil·
ity that might be incurred by the employee while acting within the
scope of employment. 237 This could be an important regulatory fea·
ture, because bonding is often the only means of assuring sufficient
assets to cover civil judgments arising from abuses of power.
The biggest problem in the area of rIDIroad police is that a citizen
might easily confuse them with public police. It is essential that they
be distinguishable, since the controls and regulations that apply to
public law enforcement officers do not apply to private railroad po·
lice. Nineteen states require that railway police wear badges that are
distinguishable from those of public police and that identify them as
railroad police. 238 While such means of distinction seem crucial, the
other twenty states provide no means by which an ordinary citizen
might ayoid confusing railway police with public police. In fact, rail·
way police derive a good deal of their authority from the fact that they
are often mistaken for public police. While railroad police have been
given broad powers in their respective jurisdictions, their jurisdiction
is generally limited to property owned by the railroad company which
employs them. One means of limiting their exercise of power to the
legal jurisdiction is to take all practical measures to insure that they
are not confused with public police.
Railroad police are presumably allowed to use weapons in the
states which grant them the power of peace officers in their respective
jurisdictions. Four states-Arizona, Arkansas, Ohio and West Virgin·
ia--expressly authorize railroad companies to require that an addi·
tional bond be posted if a railroad policeman carries a gun; however,
there are no requirements regarding the use of weapons or training
in the use of firearms.
237. Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma and Tennessee.
'
238. Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
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Fair Police
Eighteen jurisdictions have adopted statutes that provide authority for private citizens to serve as police at fairs, meetings and
exhibitions. 239 The majority of these statutes deal with police who
patrol state fairs, which are often sponsored by private corporations.
Generally, these private police have full police powers while on duty
at the event during which they were hired to serve.
In several of the eighteen jurisdictions, the power to appoint,
regulate and control these private police rests in the private corporation or society which sponsors the event. 240 In others, the private police who guard state fairs are appointed by the state department of
agriculture. 241 In four states an agency of the government, such as the
sheriff (South Carolina) or a justice of the peace (Ohio), has the
power to deputize-private persons to serve as police for the duration of
the event for which they have been appointed to patrol. 242
Probably because these police are appointed to serve for short
periods of time, controls such as residence requirements, examinations, photographs, fingerprints, cause for denial and grounds for revocation are nonexistent. Ohio is the only state that requires special
training or past experience.243 New Jersey alone requires a character
check.244 In no state is it necessary to flIP. a check to determine whether the guard has any prior criminal convictions. No state provides a
penalty for abuse of power or gross negligence, other than common
law civil actions. Ohio and South Carolina are the only states that
require the individual to post a bond to assure payment of any civil
judgment that is rendered against him while acting within the scope of
employment. 245 Michigan and Minnesota are the only states that require state fair police to wear badges that identify them as such. 246 In
the other sixteen jurisdictions, the majority of citizens with whom they
come into contact are probably under the popular misapprehension
that the private citizens who patrol state fairs are public police. While
no data are available as to the frequency with which weapons are car239. Connecticut. the District of Columbia, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
240. E.g., MICH. CoMP. 1..A.ws § 453.361 (1967).
241. For example, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 35.14 (1963).
242. For example, S.C. STAT. §§ 53-121 to 53-124 (1962).
243. Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 109.78.
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:15-4 (1973).
245. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.01 (1954); S.C. STAT. § 53-121 to 53-125
(1962).
246. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 453.371 (1967); MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 38.01 (1963).
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ried, the main problem in this area is the danger of potential abuse of
power resulting from confusion of fair police with public police.
IV.

THE USEFULNESS OF BONDING AS A :MEANS OF
REGULATING THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY

The preceding studies indicate two important conclusions regarding the developments that have occurred in the regulation of the
private police industry from the time of the Rand study in 1970 to the
present study in 1975. First, although the Rand study urged that statutes be enacted to regulate private police, there are still relatively few
comprehensive statutes which regulate the industry. There are even
fewer governmental agencies which devote substantial effort toward
the realization of such regulations. Second, the majority of states that
do regulate private police have chosen to do so through bonding or
liability insurance requirements, rather than through the establishment of uniform regulatory agencies and controls suggested by the
Rand study. Generally, the statutes only require that the licensee post
a bond or obtain insurance to cover any civil liability incurred in the
scope of employment. Employees of the licensees are largely ignored
by the statutes.
The tendency of the states to rely on bonding rather than to establish administrative agencies as the principal means of control indicated that further study of the effects of bonding was necessary. One
purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of protective devices
available directly to the public, for if such devices exist, public interest may not be severely affected by delays in the development of
comprehensive statutory regulations and/or supervisory agencies.
Previously, no data were available as to the extent to which the
public had resorted to the bonds to redress the alleged wrongs of private police. A survey was therefore undertaken of those state agencies
with which bonds have been posted. The purpose of the survey was to
ascertain the frequency of claims and related data.
Two assumptions were made concerning the bonds:
1. That the bonding requirement was premised on the belief that there was a need to
assure the existence of a fund against which
aggrieved members of the public could proceed.
2. That considering the large number of private police and the nature of their contacts
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with the public, private police activity would
have given rise to a sufficient number of
claims to be a partial but useful indicator of
the utility of this regulatory mechanism.
The results of the survey follow. Questionnaires were sent to the
secretaries of state of all fifty states; thirty-three replied. The replies
received indicate that seven states have no bonding requirement. 247
Nine others leave the decision of bonding to local authorities. 248
Thus, in these states there are no requirements for filing notice of
bonds posted with the secretary of state or any other state office
which would maintain the desired statistics on bonding.
In November, 1974 Montana enacted new legislation relating
to private police. The first licenses with bonding requirements under
the new statutes will be issued early in 1975. Thus, Montana could
not provide statistics relating to bonding and its effectiveness.

Of the other responses, eight secretaries of state indicate that an
average of 189 licensed security guard and detective agencies per
state have filed a bond with some state office. 249 Florida has on record
the largest number of bonds filed (746), while North Dakota has
the smallest number (11). Only five of the above states also require
licensed individual security guards and private detectives to post
bonds and file a record of them with a state office. 250 Again, Florida
has on record the greatest number (138), while New Hampshire has
the smallest, with only twenty-two on record.
Four states issue licenses which carry bonding requirements that
are identical for both companies and individuals. 251 No statistical separation is maintained as to individuals or agencies. Further, no
records are available as to the number or types of claims which may
be, or which are, filed.
At the other end of the spectrum, Kansas and Wisconsin require
only individual licensed detectives to be bonded and of record, while
three other states merely demand that licensed detective agencies post
bonds and file them with an appropriate office. 252
247. Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon and Tennessee.
248. California, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia and Washington.
249. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota and Vermont
250. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, New Hampshire and North Dakota.
251. Colorado, Maine, Michigan and New York.
252. Arizona, Kansas and West Virginia.
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Among the thirty-three responses received, there have been only
six reported claims filed against security guard companies and detective agencies between January 1, 1972 and January 1, 1975. One of
these claims was filed in Arizona in 1974 against a detective agency
for illegal detention. The other four claims were filed in Massachusetts, also during 1974, for ~tions not specified on the response. The
remaining claim was in New Hampshire in 1974 against an individual
for fraud. There was no indication whether this claim was against a
~ecurity guard or a private detective.
Although bonding and liability insurance requirements theoretically might provide an effective means of regulation of private police,
it is apparent from the sparse data that they do not at the present time.
The partial response that has been received indicates that bonding
provides neither an adequate avenue for redress of alleged wrongs
committed by private police officers nor any realistic means of regulation.
V.

SURVEY OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

The foregoing data indicate that the mechanisms for control of
private police are inefficient and sparse. A fundamental thesis of this
article is that the private police industry in America has been typified
by the absence of controls, In an attempt to determine' whether this
situation is likely to change in the future, the authors have surveyed
the attorneys general of ·all fifty states as to the current status of the
private 'police industry in their respective states. In addition, the attorneys general were questioned ,as to prospective legislation affecting
private police. To date, responses have been obtained from the attorneys general in twenty-nine states.

In thirteen of the twenty-nine states the existing regulations of
the private police industry are currently under review by an agency in
the executive or legislative branch of state government.253 The fact
that the industry is being reviewed in almost one-half of the states
responding to the survey indicates that there exists a moderate amount
of concern about the lack of control over the largest and most rapidly
increasing police force in our country today.
253. The states and the agencies are as follows: Colorado (Attorney General),
Connecticut (State Police Dep't), Hawaii (Dep't of Regulatory Agencies), Indiana
(State Police, Kentucky (Dep't of Justice), Massachusetts (Dep't of Public Safety),
Nebraska (Commission of Criminal Justice), Nevada (Attorney General), New Jersey (State Legislature), Texas (Board of Investigators), Vermont (Board of Private
Detective Licenses), Virginia (State ·Crime Commission), and Wisconsin (Dep't of
Licenses).
.
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Of the twenty-nine states, only four have adopted legislative
controls within the past year. 254 Seven states have, within the past
year, enacted administrative regulations which affect the private police industry.255 While most of these changes are merely means of
facilitating the administration of existing legal requirements, such as
identification and registration procedures, within the past year both
:Connecticut and Pennsylvania have adopted provisions restricting
the use of weapons by private police. This is an area which is virtually
unregulated in many states, and one in which revision of existing laws
is highly desirable. At present only Colorado, Kansas, Nevada and
North Dakota are considering actual proposed legislation for the regulation of any aspect of the private police industry.
The attorneys general were also questioned about the current
effectiveness of regulation of the private police industry in their states.
Thirteen indicated that the existing pattern of regulation adequately
protects the interests of the public. 256 Lack of regulation, difficulty of
enforcement, lack of adequate supervision and inadequacy of administrative procedures were the reasons most frequently cited by those
who consider present statutory controls inadequate.
Upon further questioning, however, twenty-one out of twentynine responses indicated specific inadequacies do in fact exist with
regard to several critical aspects of private police regulation. 257 Eleven
responses indicated that the caliber of person recruited for employment by the private police industry might not be in the best interest of
public protection. 258 Presumably this situation arises from the fact
that the private police officer is often underpaid, poorly educated and
seldom trained. 259 Thirteen responses indicated concern over the right
of private police to carry weapons. 260 Not surprisingly, the bulk of the
criticism stems from the fact that the ordinary citizen is likely to confuse private police with public police. Seventeen attorneys general replied that their state permits private police to wear uniforms that are
254. Arkansas, Minnesota, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.
255. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont and
Wisconsin.
256. Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and Virginia.
257. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
258. Alabama, Delaware, Indiana. Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
259. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 29-35.
260. Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Tennessee and Wisconsin.
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often indistinguishable from those of public police.261 Thirteen attorneys general recognized problems in the area of providing adequate
procedure for investigation of public complaints about private police.262 Absence of judicial or administrative procedures for the redress of abuses of private police power was also a major concern of
many of the responses.
The final aspect of private police regulation about which the
attorneys general were questioned was the existence and desirability of
a single state official or agency to oversee the entire private police
industry in each state. Of the twenty-four attorneys general that responded to this particular query, all except the Pennsylvania attorney
general agreed that a single statewide regulatory agency for the entire
private police industry would have a "positive effect." Ten replied
that such an agency would be desirable263 and five states considered it
"urgently needed."264 Although a single regulatory agency or official
to supervise the private police industry in an entire state is essential for
the effective regulation of private police, only sixteen of the attorneys
general have replied that such an agency or official is currently serving
this function. 265
Thus, while there is substantial concern about the lack of regulation of private police, little is currently being done about it. The lack of
prospective regulation is even more significant since the private police
industry is growing rapidly while controls remain virtually static.
It can only be expected that with the growth of this industry, there
may be an increase in the abuse of the inherent power possessed by
all policemen, be they public or private.
CONCLUSION
Modern industrial society has recognized the need for a public
police force since the early nineteenth century. The existence of law
enforcement power in the hands of police has been accepted in England, and then in the United States, only because that power has been
261. Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, N~
braska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Ver~
mont, Washington and Wisconsin.
262. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, N~
braska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin.
263. Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New JerSey, North Carolina,
Texas, Vermont and Washington.
264. Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Virginia and Wisconsin.
265. Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Min~
nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Ver~
mont and Wisconsin.
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so regulated and circumscribed that the fear of its abuse has been
somewhat assuaged. On the other hand, the need for private police is
an issue still open for debate and discussion. The questions of the roles
and functions of private police are significant because private police
have operated without the regulation and controls that were deemed
essential to the acceptance and growth of the public police.
Regulation of private police is still characterized by lack of effective and comprehensive treatment at the state level. Although a majority of the states attempt regulation through legislative enactments,
these statutes have produced only a minimal degree of supervision.
Indeed, the potentially most effective form of regulation -authorized
and required by the statutes, surety bonds, is seldom used. Thus, the
bonding procedure, like other existing statutory requirements, is a
totally inefficient instrument of control.
Although most inadequacies of current attempts at regulation
were noted in the 1970 Rand study,266 no substantial or widespread
improvement has occurred since its publication. The reasons for this
may be attributed to several factors. Among them are lack of awareness of the historical development, failure to recognize the considerable overlap between the activities of public and private police, absence
of data about the conduct of private police and lack of awareness that
the private police industry is largely unregulated. The failure of government to impose regulation on the private police industry has created the undesirable dichotomy of two police forces existing side-byside; the public one regulated, and the private one unregulated.

266. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 46-61.
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